Prisoners with Disabilities by Schlanger, Margo
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Prisoners with Disabilities 
Margo Schlanger 
University of Michigan Law School, mschlan@umich.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/114 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters 
 Part of the Disability Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Publication Information & Recommended Citation 
Schlanger, Margo. "Prisoners with Disabilities." In Reforming Criminal Justice: Punishment, Incarceration, 
and Release, edited by E. Luna, 4, 295-323. Phoenix, AZ: Academy for Justice, 2017. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
* Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
Many thanks to the commentators at the Academy for Justice conference, and to Sam Bagenstos, 
for helpful feedback. All errors are mine. I also wish to acknowledge the generous support of the 
William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan. This chapter may be copied and 
distributed for free or at cost to students or prisoners. © 2017 Margo Schlanger.
Prisoners with Disabilities
Margo Schlanger*
A majority of American prisoners have at least one disability. So 
how jails and prisons deal with those prisoners’ needs is central to 
institutional safety and humaneness, and to reentry success or failure. 
In this chapter, I explain what current law requires of prison and jail 
officials, focusing on statutory and constitutional law mandating 
non-discrimination, accommodation, integration, and treatment. 
Jails and prisons have been very slow to learn the most general lesson 
of these strictures, which is that officials must individualize their 
assessment of and response to prisoners with disabilities. In addition, 
I look past current law to additional policies that could improve 
medical and mental-health care for prisoners with disabilities. What 
is needed are programs that bridge the wall separating the inside 
and outside of prison, with respect to record-keeping, personnel, 
and finances; together, these have the potential to greatly improve 
care, and the lives and prospects, of prisoners with disabilities.
INTRODUCTION
Most American prisoners have at least one disability. The most recent 
national study, by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
found that 10% report a mobility impairment, over 6% report that they are 
deaf or low-hearing, and over 7% report that they are blind or low-vision 
(uncorrectable with glasses). Depending on the facility and the definition, 4% 
to 10% have an intellectual disability. And over half report symptoms that meet 
the criteria for various mental illnesses; mania and depression predominate, 
but 15% of state prisoners have symptoms of psychosis such as delusions or 
hallucinations.1 Forty percent of prisoners have some kind of chronic medical 
condition—diabetes, cancer, heart disease, high blood pressure, etc. All these 
statistics are for post-conviction prisoners; in jails, which house both pretrial 
detainees and post-conviction prisoners, the rates of disability are substantially 
higher. Table 1 summarizes some of the data.
1. More generally, see Stephen J. Morse, “Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice,” in Volume 
1 of the present Report.
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Some have even claimed that the massive run-up from the 1970s to the 1990s in 
prison and jail population was largely the result of “transinstitutionalization”—
the effect of housing people with mental illness in jails and prisons rather than 
2. JENNIFER BRONSON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISABILITIES 
AMONG PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-12, at 4–5 tbls.4 & 5 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf. The data in this survey are self-reported in response to the following 
questions: “Hearing—Are you deaf or do you have serious difficulty hearing? Vision—Are you 
blind or do you have serious difficulty seeing even when wearing glasses? Ambulatory—Do you 
have serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs?”
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 4–6 tbls.4-6 (“Chronic conditions include cancer, high blood pressure, stroke-
related problems, diabetes, heart-related problems, kidney-related problems, arthritis, asthma, 
and cirrhosis of the liver.”). I used the material in all three source tables to calculate the data in 
text.
6. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014, app. tbl.3 
(2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.
7. JOAN PETERSILLA, DOING JUSTICE? CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1 
(2000), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED465905.pdf.
8. See DORRIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 4 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. The data in the table are for state prisoners and local jails; this study finds 
a lower rate among federal prisoners.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Table 1: Estimates of Disability in Jails and Prisons 
 Prisons Jails 
 All Men Women All Men Women 
Vision2 7.1% 7.1% 6.4% 7.3% 7.6% 5.1% 
Hearing3 6.2% 6.2% 5.3% 6.5% 6.6% 6.0% 
Ambulatory4 10.1% 9.9% 12.1% 9.5% 8.9% 13.5% 
Chronic condition5 41%   40%   
Age 65+6  2.3% 2.3% 1.2% NA   
Intellectual or developmental  
disability7 4-10%   NA   
Mental illness symptoms: All8 49% 48% 62%  60% 59% 70% 
Mania9 43%      54%   
Major depression10 23%      30%   
Psychotic disorder11 15%      24%   
 
Some have even claimed that the massive run-up from the 1970s to the 1990s in prison and 
jail population was largely the result of “transi stitutionalizatio ”—the effect of housing people 
with mental illness in jails and prisons rather than mental hospitals.12 This is only partially true—
Raphael and Stoll demonstrate persuasively that deinstitutionalization has made only a 
“relatively small contribution to the prison population growth overall” (they estimate 4% to 7% 
of the growth).13 But as they note, it is certainly the case that “in years past,” “a sizable portion 
of the mentally ill behind bars would not have been” jaile .14 
The numbers mean that how jails and prisons deal with disability is far from a niche issue. 
Rather, choices relating to disability are central to the operation of U.S. incarcerative facilities—
                                                          
2 JENNIFER BRONSON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISABILITIES AMONG PRISON 
AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-12, at 4–5 tbls.4 & 5 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf. The data in 
this survey are self-reported in response to the following questions: “Hearing—Are you deaf or do you have serious 
difficulty hearing? Vision—Are you blind or do you have serious difficulty seeing even when wearing glasses? 
Ambulatory—Do you have serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs?” 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 BRONSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4–6 tbls.4-6 (“Chronic conditions include cancer, high blood pressure, stroke-
related problems, diabetes, heart-related problems, kidney-related problems, arthritis, asthma, and cirrhosis of the 
liver.”). I used the material in all three source tables to calculate the data in text. 
6 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014, app. tbl.3 (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.  
7 JOAN PETERSILIA, DOING JUSTICE? CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1 (2000), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED465905.pdf.  
8 See DORRIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 4 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. The 
data in the table are for state prisoners and local jails; this study finds a lower rate among federal prisoners. 
9 Id. at 1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 For a literature review, see Dae-Young Kim, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Prison Population Growth: A 
Critical Literature Review and Its Implications, 27 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3 (2016). 
13 Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to 
Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (2013). 
14 Id. 
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mental hospitals.12 This is only partially true—Raphael and Stoll demonstrate 
persuasively that deinstitutionalization has made only a “relatively small 
contribution to the prison population growth overall” (they estimate 4% to 
7% of the growth).13 But as they note, it is certainly the case that “in years past,” 
“a sizable portion of the mentally ill behind bars would not have been” jailed.14
The numbers mean that how jails and prisons deal with disability is far from 
a niche issue. Rather, choices relating to disability are central to the operation 
of U.S. incarcerative facilities—their safety and humaneness, and their success 
or failure in facilitating the pro-social community reentry of prisoners who get 
out. In this chapter, I begin by explaining what difference disability makes in jail 
and prison—how disability affects prisoners’ lives and institutional operations. 
I next explain how current law instructs prison and jail officials, focusing on 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and constitutional requirements of non-
discrimination, accommodation, integration, and treatment. Jails and prisons 
have been very slow to learn the most general lesson of these requirements, 
which is that officials must individualize their assessment of and response to 
prisoners with disabilities. I make some recommendations along these lines. 
I also suggest that as a policy matter, individualization would be helpful not 
just for prisoners with disabilities but for other prisoners, as well. That is, 
lessons learned (or lessons that should be learned) in the disability arena could 
fruitfully be applied more broadly. 
The learning point works in converse, too; general lessons learned about 
incarceration can and should be applied to prisoners with disabilities in 
particular. For example, abundant evidence demonstrates that prisoners’ 
successful reentry—their transition to productive and pro-social lives in their 
communities after release from jail and prison—is aided by programs that 
bridge the separation of prison from the outside world. This broad insight has 
specific application to prisoners with disabilities. Though the point is pertinent 
in many ways, I focus in the chapter’s final section on its import for medical 
and mental-health care, a very significant concern for people with disabilities. 
To improve care, and the lives and prospects of prisoners with disabilities, what 
is needed are bridging techniques addressing record-keeping, personnel, and 
finances. I make some recommendations toward this end. 
12. For a literature review, see Dae-Young Kim, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Prison 
Population Growth: A Critical Literature Review and Its Implications, 27 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3 
(2016).
13. Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization 
of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (2013).
14. Id.
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I write this chapter informed by scholarship, policy research, and advocacy 
reports—the various sources cited, among others. But I bring to it, as well, 
two decades of experience in prison and jail reform; investigating allegations 
of civil-rights violations; collaborating with varied stakeholders on reform 
standards;15 working with different prison and jail officials on reform efforts 
in their facilities; and, most recently, monitoring the implementation of a 
statewide settlement agreement in Kentucky governing policy and practice for 
deaf and hard-of-hearing prisoners.16 The chapter’s recommendations thus 
draw on both written and lived sources of knowledge.
I. WHY IS DISABILITY A CHALLENGE?
Incarceration isn’t easy for anyone. But sharply limited control over one’s 
own routines and arrangements make life behind bars particularly difficult for 
prisoners with disabilities. Prisoners with mobility impairments, for example, 
“cannot readily climb stairs, haul themselves to the top bunk, or walk long 
distances to meals or the pill line.”17 Prisoners who are old may “suffer from thin 
mattresses and winter’s cold”18 but often cannot obtain a more comfortable 
bed or an extra blanket. Prisoners who are deaf may not hear, and prisoners 
with intellectual disabilities may not understand, the orders they must obey 
under threat of disciplinary consequences that include extension of their term 
of incarceration. And prisoners with intellectual disabilities may be unable to 
access medical care or other resources and services, because officials require 
written requests and they are illiterate.19
Moreover, many prisoners with either mental or physical disabilities face 
grave safety threats. They may be vulnerable to extortion, exploitation, threats, 
and physical and sexual abuse by other prisoners. Prisoners with mental 
disabilities in particular may be “manipulated by other prisoners into doing 
15. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS (2011).
16. See Case Profile: Adams v. Kentucky, CIV. RTS LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13462 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) (describing case and posting 
monitoring reports). 
17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0.pdf. 
18. Id.
19. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL: USE OF FORCE AGAINST INMATES WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES IN US JAILS AND PRISONS (2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/
callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and (describing 
neglect of and inappropriate use of force against prisoners with severe mental health problems).
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things that get them into deep trouble.”20 As Hans Toch summarized, prisoners 
with mental illness can be “disturbed and disruptive,” “very troubled and 
extremely troublesome.”21 They are far more likely to be injured in a fight, and 
to be disciplined for assault.22 In the words of prisoners’ rights advocate Jamie 
Fellner, they may:
engage in symptomatic behavior that corrections staff find 
annoying, frightening, and provocative, or which, in some cases, 
can be dangerous. For example, they may refuse to follow orders to 
sit down, to come out of a cell, to stop screaming, to change their 
clothes, to take a shower, or to return a food tray. They may smear 
feces on themselves or engage in serious self-injury—slicing their 
arms, necks, bodies; swallowing razor blades, inserting pencils, 
paper clips, or other objects into their penises. Sometimes prisoners 
refuse to follow orders because hallucinations and delusions have 
impaired their connection with reality. An inmate may resist being 
taken from his cell because, for example, he thinks the officers want 
to harvest his organs or because she cannot distinguish the officer’s 
commands from what other voices in her head are telling her.23
Solitary confinement is a particular concern. Across the country, 
constitutional litigation has led to orders excluding prisoners with serious 
mental illness from solitary confinement.24 Nevertheless, people with mental 
disabilities remain vastly overrepresented in prison and jail restrictive housing 
units,25 because they are frequently difficult to manage in general population 
20. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 57 
(2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf (quoting TERRY KUPERS, PRISON 
MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 20 (1999)).
21. CALLOUS AND CRUEL, supra note 19 (quoting Hans Toch, Humpty Dumpty in the Prison, 16 
CORR. MENTAL HEALTH REP. 51 (2014)).
22. See JAMES & GLAZE , supra note 8, at 1.
23. CALLOUS AND CRUEL, supra note 19.
24. For a compilation of extant orders, see Special Collection: Solitary Confinement, CIV. RTS. 
LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=40 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
25. See ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: USE 
OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND JAILS, 2011-12, at 6–7 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/urhuspj1112.pdf (relating that prisoners with mental illness reported having 
spent time in restrictive housing at about twice the rate of other prisoners); see also ASS’N OF 
ST. CORR. ADM’RS & ARTHUR LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL: 
REPORTS FROM CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN RESTRICTED HOUSING AND ON 
THE POTENTIAL OF POLICY CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT REFORMS 48–53 (2016), https://www.law.yale.
edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/aimingtoreducetic.pdf (tracing the placement of 
prisoners with a serious mental health issue in restrictive housing).
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and because they often decompensate once in solitary and commit further 
disciplinary infractions. Two decades ago, U.S. District Judge Thelton 
Henderson emphasized the toxic effects of solitary confinement for inmates 
with mental illness.26 In Madrid v. Gomez, a case about California’s Pelican Bay 
prison, Judge Henderson wrote that isolated conditions in the Special Housing 
Unit, or SHU, while not amounting to cruel and unusual punishment for 
all prisoners, were unconstitutional for those “at a particularly high risk for 
suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health, including overt 
paranoia, psychotic breaks with reality, or massive exacerbations of existing 
mental illness.”27 Vulnerable prisoners included those with pre-existing mental 
illness, intellectual disabilities, and brain damage.28 Henderson concluded 
that “[f]or these inmates, placing them in the SHU is the mental equivalent 
of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe.”29 Their resilience 
compromised by their disability and the jail or prison’s unaccommodating 
response to it, prisoners with mental illness face a much higher risk for suicide 
both in and out of solitary confinement.30 
Sometimes officials affirmatively discriminate against prisoners with 
disabilities—bar them from programs or jobs,31 lock them down in their cells 
or isolate them in an infirmary32 or administrative segregation housing,33 even 
deny them parole as a matter of policy.34 For example, in Armstrong v. Brown, 
26. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
27. Id. at 1265
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 20, at 178. 
31. See, e.g., RACHAEL SEEVERS, AVID PRISON PROJECT, MAKING HARD TIME HARDER: PROGRAMMATIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR INMATES WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 28 
(2016), avidprisonproject.org/Making-Hard-Time-Harder/assets/making-hard-time-harder-
--pdf-version.pdf (describing involuntary status of “medically unassigned,” which barred 
prisoners from programming necessary to earn credit towards early release).
32. See id. at 35 (describing housing of inmates with serious medical conditions in a prison’s 
infirmary, even though they were medically stable).
33. See, e.g., AVID JAIL PROJECT, DISABILITY RIGHTS WASH., CRUEL BUT NOT UNUSUAL: SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT IN WASHINGTON’S COUNTY JAILS 14, 17 (2016), http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/
sites/default/files/uploads/CruelbutNotUnusual_November2016.pdf (noting that certain 
county jails in Washington state “automatically” place individuals with physical disabilities or 
mental illness in solitary confinement); see ACLU, CAGED IN: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT’S DEVASTATING 
HARM ON PRISONERS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 6 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/010916-aclu-solitarydisabilityreport-single.pdf (“[P]risoners with disabilities 
are placed into solitary confinement even when it serves no penological purpose. Corrections 
officials have put prisoners with physical disabilities into solitary confinement because there 
were no available cells that could accommodate them in a less restrictive environment.”).
34. See SEEVERS, supra note 31, at 31.
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U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken held that the state was “regularly housing 
[prisoners with mobility impairments] in administrative segregation due to 
lack of accessible housing.”35 Physical barriers—steps, inaccessible cell features, 
and the like—frequently exclude prisoners with disabilities from programs 
and resources.36 But physical barriers are just the most visible example of 
the key general problem: When the ordinary rules and ways of incarceration 
hit prisoners with disabilities harder than others, prisons and jails fail to 
accommodate their needs. 
What is to be done? Four categories of intervention are needed: diversion, 
accommodation, integration, and treatment (including discharge planning). 
The first, diversion, is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it should be obvious 
that one solution to the damage jail and prison cause people with disabilities is 
to use alternative responses to their offending behavior, reserving incarceration 
for when it is truly necessary.37 I address accommodation, integration, and 
treatment below.
II. WHAT DOES THE LAW REQUIRE?
The welfare of prisoners with disabilities is protected by both the 
Constitution and the two principal federal disability anti-discrimination 
statutes, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
Taken together, the requirements are robust: prison and jail officials must avoid 
discrimination; individually accommodate disability; maximize integration 
of prisoners with disabilities with respect to programs, service, and activities; 
and provide reasonable treatment for serious medical and mental-health 
conditions. In this section, my interspersed recommendations, accordingly, are 
consistent with existing law—at least a muscular reading of existing law. 
35. Order Granting Motion for Further Enforcement, Armstrong v. Brown, No. 94-cv-2307, 
2015 WL 496799 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-
CA-0001-0040.pdf.
36. See, e.g., SEEVERS, supra note 31, at 19 (architectural barriers in Alabama prisons), 29 
(specialized residential trauma treatment for New York women prisoners in a room reachable 
only via stairs), 32 (Iowa chapel and auditorium accessible only via stairs), 34 (New York 
commissary in inaccessible building).
37. See, e.g., REBECCA VALLAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DISABLED BEHIND BARS: THE MASS 
INCARCERATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN AMERICA’S JAILS AND PRISONS (2016), https://cdn.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/15103130/CriminalJusticeDisability-
report.pdf. For a discussion of diversion, see Michael Tonry, “Community Punishments,” in the 
present Volume.
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A. THE RULE AGAINST DISPARATE TREATMENT
Absent some other constitutional harm, the Constitution often allows 
officials to discriminate against people with disabilities—“so long as their 
actions toward such individuals are rational.”38 Statutory law, however, is less 
lenient. Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act39 and Title II of the 1990 
ADA40 prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in federally conducted 
or supported services, and state and local government services, respectively.41 
Both statutes protect from exclusion or discrimination prisoners with 
disabilities42 who are “qualified” to participate in the relevant program. The 
Rehabilitation Act does not define “qualified individual with a disability,” but 
the ADA does. That definition is: 
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of 
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the  
 
 
38. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq. (2012). The Rehabilitation Act provides, in relevant part, “No 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or 
activity conducted by any [Federal] Executive agency.” Id. § 794(a).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. (2012). Title II provides, in relevant part, “[N]o qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected 
to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132.
41. A very useful summary of the overall statutory framework and its application to prisons 
and jails is included in the United States’ Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae on Issues under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act that are Likely to Arise on Summary 
Judgment or at Trial, Miller v. Smith, No. 6:98-cv-109-JEG (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2010), http://www.
ada.gov/briefs/miller_amicus.pdf. Note that this brief was filed in June 2010, and there were new 
regulations—though not very different in pertinent part—published September 2010.
42. Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a person has a disability if: (i) a physical 
or mental impairment substantially limits one or more of his or her major life activities; (ii) 
he or she has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) he or she is regarded as having such an 
impairment. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Particularly relevant here, “mental” 
impairments are expressly included if they substantially limit major life activities. The ADA 
regulations on the definition of disability, 28 C.F.R. § 35.108, are quite capacious. Moreover, in 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Congress clarified and broadened the definition. Under the 
Amendments Act, an impairment constitutes a disability even if it: (1) only substantially limits 
one major life activity; or (2) is episodic or in remission, if it would substantially limit at least 
one major life activity if active. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 
3553, 3556.
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provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.43 
The key source for understanding what constitutes disability discrimination 
is the ADA’s Title II regulations; as legislative regulations, these are entitled to 
substantial deference.44 Most simply, discriminating against prisoners “because 
of” their physical disability, serious mental illness, or intellectual disability, 
violates the statutory ban against disparate treatment. The ADA regulations 
explain that public entities must afford qualified people with disabilities the 
same opportunity as non-disabled people to benefit from the entity’s services. 
This means a prison or jail may not, because of an inmate’s disability, deny the 
inmate the “opportunity to participate” in a service offered to other inmates, 
may not provide an alternative service “that is not equal to that afforded 
others,” and must provide aids, benefits, or services that would enable the 
inmate to “gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement 
as that provided to others.”45 A prison violates this regulation, for example, if 
simply because of their disability, it excludes prisoners with disabilities from 
a program or assigns prisoners with disabilities to segregation cells—where 
prisoners are denied most prison privileges, programs, activities, and services. 
As described in Part I, this kind of discrimination is far from unheard of.46
There are, however, defenses. Prison and jail officials can exclude a prisoner 
with a disability from a program, service, or activity if the exclusion is 
“necessary for the safe operation of its services, programs, or activities.”47 Safety 
requirements must, however, be “based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, 
stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.”48 Similarly, 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597–98 (1999) (“Because 
the Department is the agency directed by Congress to issue regulations implementing Title II, 
... its views warrant respect. We need not inquire whether the degree of deference described in 
[Chevron] is in order.”). ADA regulations are also consistent with—but newer, more detailed, 
and sometimes stricter than—Rehabilitation Act regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (“nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. §§ 790 et seq.] or the regulations issued by 
Federal agencies pursuant to such title”); 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (“regulations ... shall be consistent 
with ... the coordination regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (as 
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on Jan. 13, 1978), applicable 
to recipients of Federal financial assistance under section 794 of Title 29.”).
45. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1).
46. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
47. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h).
48. Id.
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government officials may exclude prisoners with disabilities from programs 
“when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”49 
But the Supreme Court has emphasized that under the ADA, “direct threat 
defense[s] must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on 
the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective 
evidence.’”50 And correspondingly, the regulation again requires substantial 
individualization: 
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to 
the health or safety of others, a public entity must make an 
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that 
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available 
objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity 
of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually 
occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, 
or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will 
mitigate the risk.51
Thus the ADA’s general ban on disparate treatment has a safety valve—but 
the safety valve is not satisfied by generalized concern about the abilities or 
risks of prisoners with disabilities. Disparate treatment is lawful only where 
participation in a particular program by a particular prisoner with disabilities 
raises particular—individualized, and proven not assumed—safety risks to 
others, and only where those risks cannot be mitigated by some kind of tailored 
modification of the program’s policies, practices, or procedures. 
This kind of individualization does not come easily to prisons and jails. 
Rules behind bars tend to be inflexible. Prisons and jails are mass institutions, 
and it’s easier for them to implement simple rules, without either case-by-case 
or more formalized exceptions. Officials occasionally emphasize that special 
treatment can provoke hard feelings and even violence by other prisoners. But 
in my experience, inflexibility is often an automatic rather than thoughtful 
response to a request. In any event, prisons and jails are not left to their own 
preferences with respect to the general choice of how much individualization is 
appropriate. The ADA insists on a high degree of particularization.
49. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a). 
50. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (“[T]he risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective 
evidence.”).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b).
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RECOMMENDATION: Jail and prison officials should not exclude 
prisoners with disabilities from particular housing units, jobs, or any other 
programs absent an individualized finding that a prisoner’s participation 
poses significant safety risks that cannot be mitigated.
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE MODIFICATION AND 
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
Notwithstanding the misgivings of prison and jail officials, the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA require even more individualization52 under the conceptual 
category of “reasonable modification”—the ADA Title II’s (and Title III’s) 
equivalent of the more familiar “reasonable accommodation” requirement in 
Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination.53 The Title II 
ADA regulations state:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to 
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public 
entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.54
A failure to implement a reasonable modification needed by a person with a 
disability is a type of discrimination; under the ADA, a prison must “take certain 
pro-active measures to avoid the discrimination proscribed by Title II.”55
In addition, both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA’s regulations require 
prisons and jails to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications 
with … participants … are as effective as communications with others.”56 
The effective-communication mandate protects prisoners with a variety of 
communication-impairing disabilities—among them, blindness or low vision, 
deafness or low hearing, and speech impediments. It cashes out as a requirement 
for provision of “auxiliary aids and services”57—interpreters, computer-aided 
52. See, e.g., Wright v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Title II of the 
ADA, therefore, requires that once a disabled prisoner requests a non-frivolous accommodation, 
the accommodation should not be denied without an individualized inquiry into its 
reasonableness.”).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)–(9).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The separate requirement of program accessibility has a 
similar defense that no “fundamental alteration in the nature of the service, program or activity 
or ... undue financial or administrative burdens” are required. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
55. Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324–25 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 
541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (describing the reasonable modification requirement as prophylactic).
56. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 39.160(a); 28 C.F.R. 42.503(e). 
57. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160.
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transcription services, assistive listening systems, open and closed captioning, 
various telephonic communications devices for the deaf, videophones, visual 
and other non-auditory alert systems, and more.
Federal case law has emphasized that the application of disability-rights law 
in the prison setting must take account of “[s]ecurity concerns, safety concerns, 
and administrative exigencies.”58 Even so, both reasonable modification and 
effective communication are robust and broadly relevant requirements. 
Consider a list of potential problems and ADA-required solutions:
• A prisoner with a mobility impairment cannot walk quickly enough 
to get to meals on time. Potential modifications: house the prisoner 
closer to the chow hall; allow additional time for movement and/or 
meals; if the prisoner uses a wheelchair, provide an aide to push it.
• In a prison that provides indigent prisoners with paper and stamps 
for letters home, a prisoner with an intellectual disability cannot write 
such letters because he is illiterate. Potential modifications: allow (and 
equally subsidize) communication by voice recordings or phone; 
provide a writer/reader (of his choice) to assist him.
• Successful completion of substance-abuse programming is persuasive 
evidence of rehabilitation in parole hearings, and requires academic-
type coursework a prisoner with a learning disability cannot manage. 
Potential modifications: provide tutoring or one-on-one instruction.
• Announcements are made over an audio intercom that deaf and hard-
of-hearing prisoners cannot understand. Potential modifications: a 
non-auditory alert system (vibrating pager, or strobe lights); housing a 
mildly hearing impaired prisoner in a quiet unit, where ambient noise 
poses less of an obstacle.
• Prison jobs are either required or offer prisoners compensation, 
but many of the jobs include tasks that a prisoner with a mobility 
impairment cannot perform. Potential modification: adjust job tasks 
or provide adaptive equipment to allow the prisoner to do the job.
Anyone familiar with disability law outside of prison would consider these 
run-of-the-mill accommodations. Similar responses to disability are regularly 
sought from, and granted by, employers and non-incarcerating government 
agencies. And yet, observers report—and my own experience confirms—that 
27 years after the ADA’s passage, prisons and jails do not yet fully understand 
that this kind of individualization is required by law. When prisoners seek these 
58. Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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kinds of reasonable modifications, prison and jail officials frequently deny the 
request simply by pointing to the general rule.
An example from my work as a settlement monitor illustrates the point. 
A deaf prisoner, who communicated using sign language, faced disciplinary 
sanctions for assaulting a correctional officer. As required by the settlement 
agreement I was monitoring, the prison made arrangements for sign-
language interpretation for him. This was accomplished using video remote 
interpretation—a video communication setup where the remote sign-language 
interpreter hears the person speaking through a computer microphone, and 
signs the interpretation to the deaf listener, and vice versa. In this case, however, 
the inmate had been assigned “max assault status”—which meant that 
whenever he was out of his cell, prison rules required him to be handcuffed, 
rendering him unable to sign. Rather than altering the restraint rule, prison 
officials conducting the hearing asked him only yes or no questions, so he 
could nod or shake his head to respond. My intervention was simply to ask 
the warden if there was some way to safeguard everyone’s safety but also 
provide the prisoner effective communication. The warden and his staff 
quickly developed such a method; the prisoner’s belly chain was tethered to a 
bolt in a wall, so he couldn’t move very far; under those conditions, everyone 
was comfortable unhandcuffing him. This accommodation allowed him to 
access both interpretation for various communication needs and also to use a 
videophone. It was not expensive or difficult; it merely required individualized 
consideration.
Accommodation failures seem to me even more prevalent with respect to 
less familiar accommodations that have fewer analogues outside of jail and 
prison. Along these lines, I have argued in prior work that the ADA’s reasonable-
modification requirement compels individualization with respect to disciplinary 
and restrictive housing policy. For example, the ADA’s reasonable-modification 
mandate, properly understood, compels jail and prison officials to take account 
of mental illness or intellectual disability in making housing decisions, which 
often assign disabled prisoners to double cells in which conflict and violence 
are likely.59 It forbids use of solitary confinement as a routine management 
technique to cope with the difficulties presented by prisoners with disabilities.60 
And it requires jails and prisons to treat behavior that manifests serious mental 
illness or intellectual disability as a mental-health or habilitation matter, rather 
59. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
60. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT CRESSON 
AND NOTICE OF EXPANDED INVESTIGATION 1, 32–33 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf.
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than an occasion for force or discipline.61 Thus far, these kinds of claims have 
been raised only occasionally. Nonetheless, anti-discrimination remedies along 
these lines have been incorporated in the dozen or so major solitary-confinement 
settlements in recent years.62 In addition, there is some, albeit limited, support 
in federal district court opinions: In a couple of cases, district courts have held 
that the ADA requires modification of disciplinary procedures.63 Similarly, 
at least one court has held that administrative classification processes used 
to put prisoners into solitary confinement must be reasonably modified to 
take account of the needs of prisoners with disabilities.64 And finally, a recent 
district court opinion accepted a reasonable-modification argument seeking 
greater access for prisoners with disabilities to a solitary confinement “step-
down” program.65
61. See, e.g., Private Settlement Agreement at 12, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. St. Off. 
of Mental Health, No. 1:02-cv-04002-GEL (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0048-0002.pdf; Settlement Agreement and General Release at 16, 
Disability Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-cv-00635-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015), http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-PA-0031-0003.pdf.
62. See, e.g., supra note 61. For a more complete timeline listing and linking to the key cases, 
and their settlements, see Amy Fettig & Margo Schlanger, Milestones in Solitary Reform, SOLITARY 
WATCH, http://solitarywatch.com/resources/timelines/milestones/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); and 
for court documents, see Special Collection: Solitary Confinement, CIV. RTS. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=40 (last visited Apr. 3, 
2017).
63. See Scherer v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:04-cv-00191-KRG, 2007 WL 4111412, at *44 (W.D. 
Pa. Nov. 16, 2007) (because the prisoner’s misconduct may have been a result of his mental 
illness, “the lack of modification of its disciplinary procedures to account for ... [his] mental 
illness ... possibly resulted in a violation of Title II of the ADA.”); Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 
3:00-CV-00181-LPL, 2006 WL 891449, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2006) (finding a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether a “reasonable accommodation” was denied when the Department of 
Corrections refused to circulate a memo to the staff concerning a prisoner’s Tourette’s Syndrome 
to explain that some of his behaviors were related to his condition, not intentional violations of 
prison rules). 
64. See Biselli v. Cty. of Ventura, No. 09-cv-08694 CAS (Ex), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79326, 
at *44–45 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) (placement in administrative segregation based on conduct 
specifically linked to mental illness, without input from mental health staff, may constitute a 
violation of the ADA).
65. See Sardakowski v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM, 2013 WL 3296569, at *9 (D. 
Colo. July 1, 2013) (rejecting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim given plaintiff ’s 
argument “that he has been unable to complete the requirements of the leveling-out program 
successfully because of his mental impairment and because CDOC officials have prevented him 
from obtaining adequate treatment and accommodation so that he may progress out of solitary 
confinement”); see also Reporter’s Transcript: Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Final Trial Preparation Conference at 41, Sardakowski v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM 
(D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CO-0024-0002.pdf 
(rejecting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the same claim).
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Still, implementation of this kind of individualized approach to housing 
and discipline remains rare. I don’t think jails’ and prisons’ reluctance to 
embrace individualized approaches to housing and discipline, or to operations 
more generally, can be justified doctrinally. True, the ADA’s obligation to 
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” is not 
unbounded; a modification is not required if it would “fundamentally alter the 
nature of the service, program, or activity.”66 The nature of the requested change 
matters. As in so many situations, whether it is considered “fundamental” turns 
in part on the level of generality used to describe the program and its “essential 
aspect[s].”67 Is the essence of solitary confinement its restrictive nature, or that 
it adequately safeguards safety and security? Is the essence of prison discipline 
that it punishes misconduct, or that it punishes culpable misconduct? And so 
on. But again, the ADA pushes towards individualization and flexibility. The 
very idea that some aspects of a program or policy are fundamental—but others 
are not—means that prisoner restrictions that have been treated as irrevocably 
bound together are conceptually untied. And the assertion of the defense—that 
a particular change to a prison policy or practice a prisoner with a disability 
seeks is a fundamental alteration that a prison is not required to undertake, 
rather than a reasonable modification that it must—puts the onus on the jail 
or prison to justify why it cannot make a requested change, if not for everyone, 
than for this particular disabled prisoner. As Professors Brittany Glidden and 
Laura Rovner summarized the point, “Because the accommodations should 
be specific and individualized, prison officials must demonstrate why in each 
case the particular prisoner cannot receive the requested services. As a result, 
it becomes more difficult for the prison to rely on generalized assertions of 
‘safety’ to support the deprivations and instead forces an articulation of the 
reason for the particular condition.”68
Constitutional requirements may frequently also play a role. True, the 
requirement of reasonable modification is not itself constitutional in stature. 
The Supreme Court explained in Board of Trustees v. Garrett that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require states “to make special accommodations 
for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.”69 
However, when reasonable modification to a prison policy or practice is 
necessary to avoid serious harm to a prisoner, both the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause (for convicted prisoners) and the 
66. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(7)(i).
67. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001).
68. Brittany Glidden & Laura Rovner, Requiring the State to Justify Supermax Confinement for 
Mentally Ill Prisoners: A Disability Discrimination Approach, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 55, 69 (2012).
69. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (for pretrial detainees) compel 
such modification. Under both, government officials must “respond[] 
reasonably to … risk[s]”70 to prisoners, where those risks threaten the “minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities.”71 This obligation includes, for example, 
nutrition, sanitation, large-muscle exercise, and protection from harm by 
other prisoners. So if some overarching prison policy or practice, applicable 
to prisoners with and without disabilities alike, poses an obstacle to a prisoner 
with a disability getting enough food, or living in sanitary conditions, or 
avoiding assaults by other prisoners, modification of that policy is required not 
just by the ADA but also by the Constitution.72
RECOMMENDATION: Jail and prison officials should embrace the 
ADA’s requirement of individualized modifications to policies and practices 
when useful for prisoners with disabilities’ equal participation in and access 
to services.
C. THE INTEGRATION MANDATE
The ADA regulations include a provision, usually termed the “integration 
mandate,” that directs that “A public entity shall administer services, programs, 
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
individuals with disabilities.”73 The regulation that deals specially with program 
access in prisons and jails adds some detail to this general mandate. It provides, 
in pertinent part:
(b)(2) Public entities shall ensure that inmates or detainees with 
disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate 
to the needs of the individuals. Unless it is appropriate to make an 
exception, a public entity—
(i) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in 
inappropriate security classifications because no accessible cells or 
beds are available;
(ii) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in 
designated medical areas unless they are actually receiving medical 
care or treatment; [and]
(iii) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in 
70. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994).
71. Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
72. Cf. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006) (“Goodman’s claims for money 
damages against the State under Title II were evidently based, at least in large part, on conduct 
that independently violated” the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
73. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). 
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facilities that do not offer the same programs as the facilities where 
they would otherwise be housed.74
Prisons often house prisoners with disabilities in various kinds of special 
housing that are, if not quite solitary confinement, at least close to it; they 
impose far more locked-down time than ordinary housing, restrict access to 
property, limit various privileges, etc. This kind of dedicated housing for people 
with disabilities (as well as infirmary assignments for prisoners not actually 
in need of in-patient medical care) violate the plain dictates of the ADA’s 
regulations if the housing area is not “the most integrated setting appropriate” 
to the prisoners’ needs.75 As the DOJ further explained in a brief filed in 2013, 
“[P]risoners with disabilities cannot be automatically placed in restrictive 
housing for mere convenience … the individualized assessment should, at a 
minimum, include a determination of whether the individual with a disability 
continues to pose a risk, whether any risk is eliminated after mental health 
treatment, and whether the segregation is medically indicated.”76
Similarly, a prison violates the ADA regulation if, for example, all the 
mental-health housing is high security, so that prisoners who would otherwise 
have access to gentler conditions in minimum or medium security are forced 
into harsher environments in order to get treatment.77 As already described, 
in Armstrong v. California, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California found that the plaintiff prisoners, who had mobility impairments, 
were being housed in solitary confinement simply because there were no 
accessible cells available elsewhere.78 This, Judge Wilken held, violated the clear 
terms of the provisions quoted above.79
More commonly, though, confinement of prisoners with disabilities to 
restrictive housing is not because of a shortage of accessible cells elsewhere, 
but rather because prisons choose to manage difficult, disability-related 
74. 28 C.F.R. § 35.152.
75. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
76. Response of the United States of America to Defendants’ Motion in Limine No.4: To 
Exclude the Statement of Interest at 4, Coleman v. Brown, 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-DAD (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-0041.pdf (and 
Appendix).
77. This argument was made in some detail by the plaintiffs in the pioneering case Disability 
Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 1:02-cv-04002-GEL (S.D.N.Y. 2007), http://
www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5560.
78. See Order Granting Motion for Further Enforcement, Armstrong v. Brown, No. 94-cv-
02307-CW, 2015 WL 496799 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
public/PC-CA-0001-0040.pdf.
79. Id. at 1.
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behavior with solitary confinement rather than less harsh housing assignments 
and services. In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court required states to 
deinstitutionalize people with disabilities who had been unjustifiably assigned 
to receive various state-provided services in segregated institutions rather than 
in the community.80 In prison or jail, when solitary confinement is triggered by 
a prisoner’s disability (and resulting conduct), that means that prison services 
are provided in a setting that lessens the prisoner’s contact with other, non-
disabled prisoners. This is “segregated” not only in the way the term is used in 
prison, but also in the way the term is used in the Olmstead opinion to describe 
civil institutionalization, which the Court held can be a form of unlawful 
discrimination.81
The ADA’s integration mandate presumes that such segregation is harmful. 
That is, the regulation itself bans an under-justified decision to isolate 
people with disabilities from other, non-disabled people; plaintiffs need not 
demonstrate how that decision hurts them. In addition, a decade of litigation 
under Olmstead in other settings has established that the solution for violations 
of the integration mandate is the provision of services in integrated settings 
that avoid the need to segregate.82 For example, in United States v. Delaware, 
an Olmstead settlement between the DOJ and the state of Delaware required 
statewide crisis services to “[p]rovide timely and accessible support to 
individuals with mental illness experiencing a behavioral health crisis, including 
a crisis due to substance abuse.”83 The settlement detailed numerous items that 
would form a “continuum of support services intended to meet the varying 
80. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). For more on Olmstead and its implementation, see U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIV. RTS. DIV., STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION 
MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. (2011), http://
www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.pdf.
81. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598. The plaintiffs in California’s Coleman litigation, a class action 
on behalf of prisoners with serious mental illness, have made the fullest version of this argument. 
See Notice of Motion & Motion for Enforcement of Court Orders & Affirmative Relief Re: 
Improper Housing & Treatment of Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners in Segregation, Coleman 
v. Brown, 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2013), http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-0066.pdf; Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief Regarding Enforcement of 
Court Orders and Affirmative Relief Regarding Improper Housing and Treatment of Seriously 
Mentally Ill Prisoners in Segregation, Coleman v. Brown, 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-DAD (E.D. Cal. 
Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0002-0065.pdf. In the end, 
the District Court did not address the argument, ruling entirely on constitutional grounds. 
Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
82. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012).
83. Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Delaware, 1:11-cv-00591-LPS (D. Del. July 6, 
2011), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-DE-0003-0002.pdf.
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needs of individuals with mental illness.”84 This included Assertive Community 
Treatment teams—multidisciplinary groups “including a psychiatrist, a nurse, 
a psychologist, a social worker, a substance abuse specialist, a vocational 
rehabilitation specialist and a peer specialist”—to “deliver comprehensive, 
individualized, and flexible support, services, and rehabilitation to individuals 
in their homes and communities,” and various kinds of case management.85 And 
it provided for “an array of supportive services that vary according to people’s 
changing needs and promote housing stability” and “integrated opportunities 
for people to earn a living or to develop academic or functional skills.”86 Other 
Olmstead decrees contain similar provisions.87
The Delaware settlement and other Olmstead cases provide a very helpful 
model for how prisons could comply with the integration mandate, managing 
the needs of prisoners with disabilities to keep them out of the segregated 
solitary-confinement setting. The possibilities are broad: provision of coaching 
and mental-health treatment and other supports, perhaps assignment to a one-
person cell to minimize intra-cell conflict, and many more.
RECOMMENDATION: Prisons and jails should avoid separating 
prisoners with disabilities from other prisoners, and should implement 
supports helpful to avoid the need for such separation, including coaching, 
mental-health treatment, single cells where useful, and others.
D. KEY FEATURES OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES
As I’ve already argued, individualization and integration do not come 
naturally to jails and prisons—total institutions that prefer standardized to 
singular treatment. It may be helpful, then, to explore briefly how a jail or 
prison could maximize its ability to implement the recommendations I’ve just 
made by using four procedural components: interaction with the prisoner, 
notice to the prisoner of available services and accommodations, structured 
consideration, and concentrated development of expertise and responsibility.
Because disability-related needs are so varied, disability-rights statutes 
often require what is often called an “interactive process” for the development 
of accommodations. The ADA’s Title I (employment) regulation urges 
that an “informal, interactive process” “may be necessary” to “identify the 
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 5–6.
86. Id. at 7–8.
87. See Special Collection: Olmstead Cases, CIV. RTS. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.
clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=7 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) (listing 
cases).
Prisoners with Disabilities 313
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable 
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”88 The EEOC’s 
guidance explains that the procedure should be “flexible [and] interactive” and 
should “involve[] both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.”89 
And, as one federal appellate court has explained, this approach is not 
“especially burdensome.” The idea is simply to:
meet with the employee who requests an accommodation, 
request information about the condition and what limitations 
the employee has, ask the employee what he or she specifically 
wants, show some sign of having considered employee’s request, 
and offer and discuss available alternatives when the request is too 
burdensome.90 
Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires 
that a child’s individualized education program be developed in a process 
that is calculated to understand the child’s needs and goals, and that includes 
his or her parents.91 Particularly under the IDEA, part of the process is 
providing information to the parent on rights and available services and 
accommodations.92
ADA Title II’s regulations do not include “interactive process” language, 
but courts have nonetheless imported the approach, which is sensibly geared 
toward assessing individualized needs and solutions.93 In a prison or a jail, an 
interactive process has two advantages. First, it involves the prisoner, who is 
best equipped to know his own needs and circumstances. Second, it structures 
a focused consideration of the disability issues—the situation, the potential 
solutions, and their pros and cons.
It’s useful to designate who as well as what the process includes. Disability 
accommodation requires knowledge of what the law requires—the content of 
the sections preceding this one. Equally important, it requires knowledge of 
multiple technologies and techniques. Take a relatively easy question: What 
can be done to provide access to telephone communication to a prisoner who 
is too hard of hearing to use a regular phone, but who doesn’t sign? To answer 
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
89. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.
90. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 162 (3d Cir. 1999).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
92. On parental involvement in the IEP process in general, see MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 5.2 (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343(c)(iii), 300.346(a)(1)
(i), 300.346(b)).
93. See, e.g., Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
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requires awareness of the range of devices available—for example, amplifiers 
(including their interaction with hearing aids), or devices such as captioned 
telephones.94 In correctional facilities, there are added complications. What 
kinds of amplifiers are sturdy enough for congregate facilities and capable of 
use with (usually low-tech and analog signal) prison pay phones? How can a 
captioned telephone be linked to the prison phone-billing system? And so on. In 
the case I am monitoring, a variety of obstacles to the state’s first installation of 
a captioned telephone took several months to solve. The point is, it is essential 
for each facility to designate a disability or ADA coordinator who can develop 
the requisite regulatory and practical expertise. The ADA Title II regulations 
require designation of a “responsible employee” at the agency level,95 but in my 
experience, few prisons or jails have anyone playing this role.
All this is the base for a procedural recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Jails and prisons should create a process for 
consideration of disability issues, which should include notice to prisoners 
with disabilities of their rights and available resources, services, and 
accommodations; and individualized consideration of the prisoners’ 
requests and any alternatives. A designated ADA coordinator should 
develop appropriate expertise in disability, legal requirements, and technical 
solutions for disability-related needs.
E. TREATMENT—INCLUDING INTAKE AND DISCHARGE PLANNING
People with disabilities frequently have chronic and serious medical/mental-
health treatment needs. Jails and prisons are constitutionally required to meet 
those needs.96 That requirement extends not only to treatment in jail and prison 
(including prompt medical and mental-health assessment and management), 
but the period of time post-release before a released prisoner can reasonably 
94. See Internet Protocol (IP) Captioned Telephone Service, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/
consumers/guides/internet-protocol-ip-captioned-telephone-service (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) 
(“CTS [captioned telephone service] allows a person with hearing loss but who can use his or her 
own voice and has some residual hearing, to speak directly to the called party and then listen, to 
the extent possible, to the other party and simultaneously read captions of what the other party 
is saying.”).
95. 28 C.F.R. § 35.107(a). On what an effective ADA coordinator needs to know and be 
empowered to do, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA BEST PRACTICES TOOL KIT FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS (2006) https://www.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/chap2toolkit.pdf.
96. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
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obtain external treatment.97 In addition, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
require, at the very least, elimination of obstacles to treatment: As the Supreme 
Court noted in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, medical care 
is among the “services, programs, or activities” encompassed by the statutory 
text.98 The Court confirmed the point in United States v. Georgia, when it 
deemed “quite plausible” the plaintiff ’s claim that “deliberate refusal of prison 
officials to accommodate [his] disability-related needs in such fundamentals 
as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs 
constituted ‘exclu[sion] from participation in or … den[ial of] the benefits of ’ 
the prison’s ‘services, programs, or activities.’”99 
But the statutory disability claims may reach further. After all, without 
treatment, prisoners with both physical and mental disabilities are more 
likely to run into trouble of various kinds, leading them to disciplinary or 
administrative exclusions from facility programs, services, and activities. A 
prisoner who needs but does not have a hearing aid may face disciplinary 
consequences for noncompliance with directives he cannot hear—and will 
certainly be unable to benefit from many programs. The latter is also true for a 
prisoner whose abilities are compromised by an untreated chronic illness. The 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act don’t require most government entities to provide 
medical care. But it seems to me a plausible argument that in prison and jail, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he state must 
provide an outgoing prisoner who is receiving and continues to require medication with a supply 
sufficient to ensure that he has that medication available during the period of time reasonably 
necessary to permit him to consult a doctor and obtain a new supply.”); Lugo v. Senkowski, 114 
F. Supp. 2d 111, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The State has a duty to provide medical services for an 
outgoing prisoner who is receiving continuing treatment at the time of his release for the period 
of time reasonably necessary for him to obtain treatment on his own behalf.”); see also Brad H. v. 
City of New York, 712 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. 2000), order aff ’d, 716 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000) (similar outcome under state law).
98. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
99. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006) (alterations in original).
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where medical and mental-health care are among the services provided, denial 
of particular treatments needed by people with disabilities also constitutes 
actionable discrimination.100
In any event, the resulting recommendation is a simple one to state, though 
complex to comply with:
RECOMMENDATION: Jails and prisons should provide appropriate 
intake assessment, treatment, and discharge planning for the medical and 
mental-health needs of people with disabilities.
F. THE LARGER LESSON
It’s not only prisoners with disabilities who can benefit from individualization. 
I’ve just argued, for example, that a prisoner with an intellectual disability that 
renders him illiterate, and therefore unable to take advantage of subsidies for 
letters home, should receive an accommodation—subsidized phone calls, a 
reader/writer, or something similar. Such an accommodation is equally useful 
to any prisoner who is illiterate, even if he does not have an intellectual disability. 
Likewise, for anyone who is in segregated housing because of a security risk, it 
only makes sense for prison officials to limit the restrictions to what is actually 
necessary. There’s no reason, for example, to restrict access to phone calls, books, 
or television for a prisoner temporarily locked down because of threats against 
her. Even when the ADA is not requiring the more individualized approach, 
it’s sensible to unbundle the potential privilege restrictions and apply only the 
ones that are necessary.
III. BRIDGING THE PRISON WALLS
Abundant evidence demonstrates that prisoners’ successful reentry—their 
transition to productive and pro-social lives in their communities after release 
from jail and prison—is aided by programs that bridge the walls that separate 
100. See, e.g., Plaintiff ’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Anderson v. Colorado, No. 
10-cv-01005-WYD-KMT (D. Colo. July 21, 2011), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CO-0017-0006.pdf; Plaintiff ’s Trial Brief, Anderson v. Colorado, No. 10-cv-01005-WYD-KMT 
(D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CO-0017-0007.pdf. 
In these pleadings, the plaintiff argued that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act barred the prison’s 
“refus[al] to provide the reasonable accommodation (in the form of treatment and medication) 
necessary to permit Mr. Anderson to be integrated with other prisoners,” and, in the alternative, 
that “if—even with proper medication and treatment—his mental illness requires that he be kept 
in ad seg, he is qualified for a number of programs and benefits that he is now being denied based 
solely on that placement. Because that is tantamount to denying him these programs and benefits 
based on his disability, it constitutes illegal discrimination under the ADA and RA.” Plaintiff ’s 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, at 42. The court denied these claims on the 
facts. Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1146–48 (D. Colo. 2012).
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prison from the outside world. We know that effective reentry planning “starts 
on the inside and continues upon release.”101 Among the most effective bridging 
methods is when “[t]he same re-entry planner or case manager works with the 
detainee on the inside and on the outside and serves as an advocate for his 
successful re-entry.”102 Mentor programs often use a similar strategy; mentors 
begin working with prisoners prerelease, and continue through a reentry 
period.103 
This broad insight has specific application to prisoners with disabilities 
and their medical and mental-health care. To improve care, and the lives 
and prospects of prisoners with disabilities, what is needed are wall-bridging 
techniques addressing record-keeping, personnel, and finances. The idea is not 
complicated. If jail and prison health care could be integrated with community 
health care in these three arenas, the result would not be merely improved 
health behind bars but improved community health.
1. Health records
Transitions are a dangerous time for health services. At hospitals, the most 
dangerous hours of the day are the shift changes. For prisoners with acute 
health needs, one dangerous time is arrival at a new facility—when medication 
is often confiscated, skipped, or lost; health histories can be hazardously 
incomplete; and (particularly in jail) the prisoner is often in crisis. Another 
dangerous time is release—when prisoners usually leave with only a few days’ 
worth, if that, of any medication, without a doctor’s appointment to get a refill, 
and often far from their families without transportation home.104
101. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., LINKING RE-ENTRY PLANNING TO COMMUNITY-BASED 
CORRECTIONAL CARE 2 (2009), http://www.thebridginggroup.com/pdf/Linking_Re-Entry_
Planning_to_Community-Based_Correctional_Care_Zack_2009.pdf. See generally Susan 
Turner, “Reentry,” in the present Volume.
102. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 101, at 2.
103. See SHAWN BAULDRY ET AL., MENTORING FORMERLY INCARCERATED ADULTS: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
READY4WORK REENTRY INITIATIVE 7 tbl.2 (2009), http://ppv.issuelab.org/resources/1948/1948.pdf; 
see also BYRON R. JOHNSON & DAVID B. LARSON, THE INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIATIVE: A PRELIMINARY 
EVALUATION OF A FAITH-BASED PRISON PROGRAM 16 (2008), http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/
document.php/25903.pdf (“It was hoped that the mentoring relationship that was developed 
while the offender was still in prison would continue during the difficult months following 
release from prison.”).
104. See, e.g., Jacques Baillargeon et al., Accessing Antiretroviral Therapy Following Release 
from Prison, 301 JAMA 848, 855 (2009) (“In this 4-year study of HIV-infected inmates released 
from the nation’s largest state prison system, we found that only 5% of released inmates filled a 
prescription for ART medications soon enough ... to avoid treatment interruption.”)
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An integrated system of health records shared between community and 
jail health providers doesn’t altogether solve the problem, but it can help. 
For example, when medications are needed right away on incarceration, an 
existing prescription record could be an enormous help. More generally, to 
quote the talking points from one innovative county’s presentation on their 
implementation of such a system, integrated records “improve access to 
timely and appropriate health care information during clinical encounters” 
and “improve the overall clinical care of the client by the connection with 
community providers.”105
RECOMMENDATION: Health records in jails and prisons should be 
electronic and integrated with community health records.
2. Personnel
In medical and mental-health care as in other areas, people are the best 
bridges. There are a variety of models.106 In both New York City and Washtenaw 
County, Michigan, for example, mental-health care in the jail is provided by the 
same agency, and sometimes the same people, as mental-health care outside.107 
In two Rhode Island programs for HIV-infected inmates, the personnel 
who stay constant are not the treating professionals but case managers.108 In 
another Michigan county program, a “medical navigator” and community 
health workers begin meeting with prisoners months prior to their release, and 
continue with case-management services post-release.109
Community service providers are useful for three reasons: continuity of 
care; expertise in available community services; and non-prison attitude. The 
105. SAMHSA-HRSA CTR. FOR INTEGRATED HEALTH SOLUTIONS, BRIDGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
AND COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE: INTEGRATION’S ROLE IN REENTRY (2013), http://www.integration.
samhsa.gov/Presentation_FINAL.pdf. The program described is for the Multnomah County 
Health Department; see also BEN BUTLER, CMTY. ORIENTED CORR. HEALTH SERVS., JAILS AND HEALTH 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR CREATING CONNECTIVITY (2013), http://www.cochs.
org/files/HIT-paper/cochs_health_it_case_study.pdf, for a case study of this and several other 
projects.
106. I lean here largely (though not entirely) on programs cited in Kavita Patel et al., Integrating 
Correctional And Community Health Care For Formerly Incarcerated People Who Are Eligible For 
Medicaid, 33 HEALTH AFF. 468 (2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/33/3/468.long.
107. See BUTLER, supra note 105, at 14; Correctional Services Description, EWASHTENAW, http://
www.ewashtenaw.org/government/sheriff/divisions/corrections/correctional-services (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2017).
108. Patel et al., supra note 106, at 469-70.
109. Michigan Pathways Project Links Ex-Prisoners to Medical Services, Contributing to a Decline 
in Recidivism, AGENCY HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Feb. 2, 2009), https://innovations.ahrq.gov/
profiles/michigan-pathways-project-links-ex-prisoners-medical-services-contributing-decline.
Prisoners with Disabilities 319
first two are self-explanatory. The third is equally important. Correctional 
facility doctors and nurses can be expert and compassionate providers. But 
sometimes prisons and jails become the employers of last resort for subpar 
clinicians. A number of states have a practice of granting “restricted licenses” 
to doctors who work in prisons but do not meet the requirements for full 
licensure.110 And in some states, doctors whose disciplinary records make them 
unattractive employees elsewhere find jobs in the prison system.111 Even when 
clinicians have unrestricted licenses and clean records, research establishes 
that prison doctors and nurses tend to be more jaded and less empathetic 
toward their patients when compared with their civilian counterparts.112 As 
experienced correctional physician Robert Greifinger has summarized: “There 
is far too much cynicism regarding inmates among correctional health care 
professionals, who work in environments of constant tension. Too often these 
professionals are skeptical about inmates’ concerns and complaints, believing 
that the inmates (who do often exaggerate) are malingering for secondary gain. 
Correctional health care staff also frequently incorporate the custody staff ’s 
fear that humane responsiveness is coddling that can lead to anarchy.”113
When medical and mental-health staff work both in and out of correctional 
facilities, that counteracts both the tendency toward lower hiring standards and 
lower levels of compassion toward the patients. Even if in a particular setting it 
makes sense to hire people who work only in a correctional facility, it is helpful 
in terms of hiring, supervision, and mindset if their employing organization is 
focused on community as well as correctional care.
RECOMMENDATION: Medical and mental-health staff in jails and 
prisons should have employing organizations whose focus is on community 
in addition to correctional care.
110. See John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of 
The Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 443–44 
(2006).
111. See Cindy Chang, Many Doctors Treating State’s Prisoners Have Disciplinary Records 
Themselves, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 29, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/07/
many_doctors_treating_states_p.html.
112. See Naveen Dhawan et al., Physician Empathy and Compassion for Inmate-Patients in 
the Correctional Health Care Setting, 13 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 257, 264 (2007) (“[C]orrectional 
physicians describe a developmental course in which they become increasingly able to empathize 
with inmates during a period of years of working in a correctional setting.”); Kristine E. Shields 
& Dorothy de Moya, Correctional Health Care Nurses’ Attitudes Toward Inmates, 4 J. CORR. HEALTH 
CARE 37, 37 (1997).
113. Robert B. Greifinger, Inmates As Public Health Sentinels, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y, 253, 262 
(2006). 
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3. Finances and discharge planning
Finally, there is simply no justification for the current law and practices 
governing the financing of inmate health care. As so often in health law, this 
issue is technically complicated. Since its inception, Medicaid has excluded 
“inmates of public institutions” from “federal financial participation”—
which is to say, coverage.114 That exclusion has never affected inmate eligibility 
to enroll, just their actual receipt of Medicaid benefits.115 Nonetheless, even 
prisoners who were eligible, because of age or disability, have most often had 
their Medicaid enrollment terminated rather than merely suspended, during 
their time in jail and prison. The result was months of delay for former inmates 
to be reapproved for Medicaid on release from incarceration.116
In the past, the use of Medicaid termination rather than suspension did 
not affect most prisoners, however, because they were not Medicaid-eligible 
in any event. As adults without dependent children and without a Social 
Security Administration-recognized disability, they did not meet their states’ 
eligibility criteria notwithstanding their low income. The Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) changed that part of the picture when it allowed states to expand 
Medicaid coverage to everyone who earns up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level and is under 65 (People 65 and older are covered under Medicare).117 As 
of January 2017, 31 states and the District of Columbia had signed up for the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion funding.118 The result is that nearly all inmates in 
those states are now Medicaid-eligible. Enrollment comes with two benefits 
for them and their jailers: First, Medicaid will cover a large portion of the cost 
of care delivered outside the institution—at a hospital, for example—when 
the prisoner has been admitted to that hospital for 24 hours or more. Second, 
Medicaid enrollment greatly smooths the transition to community health 
care on release. To realize these benefits, however, states need to enroll their 
inmates—and to suspend rather than terminate prisoner participation in the 
114. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(1).
115. See Letter from Glenn Stanton, Acting Dir., Disabled & Elderly Health Programs Grp., to 
State Medicaid Directors, CMS Assoc. Reg’l Adm’rs for Medicaid (May 25, 2004), https://www.
medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/downloads/community-living/ending-chronic-homelessness-smd-
letter.pdf (discussing ending chronic homelessness).
116. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., HEALTH COVERAGE AND COUNTY JAILS SUSPENSION VS. TERMINATION 
1 (2014), http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Suspension-termination-DEC2014 
(2).pdf; see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.912 (capping Medicaid eligibility determinations based on 
disability at 90 days and other applications at 45 days).
117. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
118. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-decision/.
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program while they are housed in jail or prison. States have been making real 
though not complete progress on these fronts.119 
Much more broadly (and admittedly unrealistically in the current political 
climate), to my mind, the exclusion of prisoners from Medicaid makes no sense 
at all. If the federal government is going to be responsible for health-care costs 
for poor people, why exclude prisoners? I suppose there’s an argument that 
since the states and local governments are constitutionally required to pay for 
medical care, Medicaid coverage would not increase access to care, but merely 
shift the payer (of course, if that’s the logic, the exclusion from the exclusion 
for hospital stays is an oddity). But even if Medicaid continues to exclude 
prisoners, there is no reason at all that prisoners shouldn’t be enrolled, to 
facilitate coverage for them when they leave. The absence of Medicaid coverage 
is one of the reasons that the death rate for released prisoners is several 
times higher than for others of similar age, race, and sex.120 The availability 
of insurance makes discharge planning possible: case managers can connect 
inmates heading toward release with providers in their community and can 
even schedule necessary post-release appointments.
RECOMMENDATION: Congress should extend Medicaid coverage for 
Medicaid-eligible prisoners. In the alternative, jails and prisons should 
enroll all eligible prisoners in Medicaid, and suspend rather than terminate 
Medicaid coverage for prisoners. 
RECOMMENDATION: Jail and prison case managers should undertake 
systematic discharge planning for medical and mental-health care; prisoners 
should be released with sufficient medication to get them to a scheduled 
appointment with an appropriate provider.
119. See Sachini N. Bandara et al, Leveraging the Affordable Care Act to Enroll Justice-
Involved Populations in Medicaid, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2044 (2015); Medicaid Eligibility for People 
Leaving Incarceration Is Smart Policy, FAMILIES USA (July 12, 2016), http://familiesusa.org/
sites/default/files/product_documents/ENR_Suspension%20v.%20Termination%20Map%20
Infographic_07-12-16.pdf. In addition, in April 2016, the Obama Administration issued guidance 
on “facilitating access to covered Medicaid services for eligible individuals prior to and after a 
stay in a correctional institution.” That guidance provided that individuals in halfway houses 
would often be covered by Medicaid (if they had a certain degree of freedom of movement). 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State Health Official 
Letter No. 16-007 (Apr. 28, 2016). 
120. Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—A High Risk of Death for Former Inmates, 
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 157 (2007). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Here is a summary of this chapter’s recommendations:
1. Jail and prison officials should not exclude prisoners with disabilities 
from particular housing units, jobs, or any other programs absent an 
individualized finding that a prisoner’s participation poses significant 
safety risks that cannot be mitigated.
2. Jail and prison officials should embrace the ADA’s requirement of 
individualized modifications to policies and practices when useful for 
prisoners with disabilities’ equal participation in and access to services.
3. Prisons and jails should avoid separating prisoners with disabilities from 
other prisoners, and should implement supports helpful to avoid the need 
for such separation, including coaching, mental-health treatment, single 
cells where useful, and others.
4. Jails and prisons should create a process for consideration of disability 
issues, which should include notice to prisoners with disabilities of 
their rights and available resources, services, and accommodations; 
and individualized consideration of the prisoners’ requests and any 
alternatives. A designated ADA coordinator should develop appropriate 
expertise in disability, legal requirements, and technical solutions for 
disability-related needs.
5. Jails and prisons should provide appropriate intake assessment, treatment, 
and discharge planning for the medical and mental-health needs of people 
with disabilities.
6. Health records in jails and prisons should be electronic and integrated 
with community health records.
7. Medical and mental-health staff in jails and prisons should have employing 
organizations whose focus is on community in addition to correctional care.
8. Congress should extend Medicaid coverage for Medicaid-eligible 
prisoners. In the alternative, jails and prisons should enroll all eligible 
prisoners in Medicaid, and suspend rather than terminate Medicaid 
coverage for prisoners. 
9. Jail and prison case managers should undertake systematic discharge 
planning for medical and mental-health care; prisoners should be released 
with sufficient medication to get them to a scheduled appointment with 
an appropriate provider.
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